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Abstract
Using a unique data set on all industrial ﬁrms listed on Korea Stock Exchange and
KOSDAQ stock market from 1991 to 2000, we ﬁnd that cash ratios for chaebol ﬁrms are lower
than for non-chaebol ﬁrms. Controlling for access to the bond market and ﬁnancial services
arms does not change this result. We do however ﬁnd that there is a shift in the degree of bank
power over the last decade. Consistent with the main bank monopoly hypothesis during the
period of corporate restructuring process after the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, the interest
di#erential charged to chaebol ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than the earlier period, suggesting
a substantial extraction of rents against chaebol client ﬁrms by their main banks.
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The contemporary banking literature has analyzed the beneﬁts and costs of the close
relationship between banks and their client ﬁrms. When banks and their borrowers have close
ties, main banks’ delegated monitoring of client ﬁrms can avoid duplication and the potential
free-rider problems (Diamond, 1984).
1 The long-term bank-ﬁrm relationship mitigates prob-
lems of asymmetric information between two agents, which results in optimal renegotiated
debt contracts with lowered ﬁnancing costs and reduced credit rationing ((Hellwig (1989),
Sharpe (1990), Boot and Thakor (1994), and Peterson and Rajan (1995)). The analysis by
Rajan (1992), in contrast, predicts that private information provides banks with the power and
the opportunity to extract rents from their client ﬁrms, which may lead to moral-hazardous
behavior by the borrowers.
2
Empirical evidence on rent-seeking behavior by main banks under bank-centered ﬁnancial
systems is mixed. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) using data on German main bank (i.e.,
housebank) behavior, ﬁnd that credit margins are not a#ected by the lending relationship and
that there is no signiﬁcant di#erence in loan pricing between housebanks and normal banks.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), on the other hand, report that the average cost of borrowing is
higher for Japanese business group (keiretsu)a $liated ﬁrms than independent ﬁrms, although
close bank-ﬁrm ties increase the availability of capital to keiretsu-a$liated ﬁrms. Pinkowitz
and Williamson (2001) also ﬁnd the value of main bank as a corporate governance mechanism
to be doubtful, since they report that during periods in Japan when the main bank has greater
monopoly power ﬁrms hold larger cash balances, which have substantial opportunity costs.
In an examination of 1991 balance sheet data for G-7 countries, Rajan and Zingales
(1995) ﬁnd that cash ratios range from 8.2 percent to 18.4 percent.
3 They report that in
general, ﬁrms in countries where there exists greater access to external ﬁnancing, especially
capital markets, tend to hold less cash. These ﬁrms are generally large, and have good credit
ratings. On the other hand, ﬁrms in countries where lending institutions have the monopoly
power, have much higher levels of cash holdings, indicating that cash holdings may be used as
an e#ective indicator of rent extraction.
In this paper, we investigate the e#ect of main bank relationship on the cash and deposits
holdings and cost of borrowing using data from Korean business group (chaebol)a $liated
ﬁrms (here-in-after chaebol ﬁrms) and non-chaebol ﬁrms. In Korea the 30 largest chaebol
historically have been required to operate with a main bank. A list of the 30 largest chaebol and
their designated main banks is provided in Appendix 1. The government initiated a main bank
1 A main bank is deﬁned as a bank, which has maintained a long-term relationship with its client ﬁrm, and the
bank o#ers primary ﬁnancial services to the client. Nam and Kim (1994) review the Korean main bank system.
The main functions of main banks include examining clients’ plans for improving their capital structure and
management, setting ceilings on credit allocations, and overseeing extensions of new credit. A non-main bank must
consult its chaebol client ﬁrm’s main bank when extending new credit to the ﬁrm. The main bank in Korea is
broadly viewed as a legal term for regulators to control credit allocation among chaebol.
2 See Boot (2000) for a recent review of the literature on “relationship banking.”
3 Cash ratios are determined as cash plus short-term investments divided by the book value of total assets,
which are then averaged across all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in each country. The cash ratio for Canada is 8.2% and that
for Japan is 18.4 percent in the study by Rajan and Zingales (1995). A recent study by Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2001) shows similar results of cash ratios for Germany, Japan, and the U.S.
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support of government policy of fostering rapid economic development through export-led
growth. Non-chaebol ﬁrms (which in this paper we will take to mean ﬁrms outside the 30
largest chaebol) were generally not required to have main banks. The main bank system in
Korea constituted a long-term relationship between chaebol ﬁrms and main banks. The major
issue to be addressed in this paper is whether main banks were able to exploit chaebol ﬁrms
with their monopoly power. In order to examine this issue, we ﬁrst look at whether Korean
chaebol ﬁrms have higher cash holdings than non-chaebol ﬁrms. If main banks were extracting
rents from non-bank ﬁrms, ﬁrms with main banks would have larger amount of short-term
deposits and marketable securities in the banks than ﬁrms without main banks. Therefore, if
status of main bank carries monopoly power, chaebol ﬁrms would have higher cash holdings
than non-chaebol ﬁrms when other things are constant.
Using all Korean industrial ﬁrms listed between 1991 and 2000, we ﬁnd that the cash ratio
of ﬁrms in chaebol is about 2 to 4 percent lower than that of non-chaebol ﬁrms. It appears that
unlike Japanese main bank system where main banks historically have power over their related
ﬁrms, Korean main banks are too weak to extract rents from their client ﬁrms, although both
Japanese and Korean main banks have had a long-term relationship with their client ﬁrms.
Surprisingly, our 10 year (from 1991 to 2000) average cash ratio of 5.1 %f or chaebol ﬁrms is
less than one-third of the average cash ratio for Japanese ﬁrms reported in Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001). In their samples, about half of the ﬁrms are
Japanese business group or keiretsu ﬁrms.
4 The restrictions on ﬁrm equity ownership by banks
may have led banks to exercise only limited power in Korea. We ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms not
a$liated with a chaebol hold signiﬁcantly higher levels of cash relative to assets and to bank
loans. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that banks are extracting rents against small
less known ﬁrms rather than against prestigious clients regardless of the length of the banking
relationship.
We ﬁnd that chaebol and non-chaebol ﬁrms with access to the bond market maintain lower
cash holdings than do ﬁrms without such access. Access to the bond market would seem to
reduce cash holdings by about half the reduction brought by chaebol status. Chaebol ﬁrms
continue to have signiﬁcantly lower cash balances than non-chaebol ﬁrms even after control-
ling for access to the bond market. Controlling for access to the bond market does not reduce
the magnitude of the e#ect on cash holdings of chaebol status. These results are robust across
the pre-crisis (1991-1996) and the post-crisis (1997-2000) periods. The presence of a ﬁnancial
arm within a chaebol was not found to reduce cash holdings of ﬁrms in that chaebol that
already conferred by chaebol status.
The ratio of non-bond interest expense to bank loan across ﬁrms is no higher for
non-chaebol ﬁrms than for chaebol ﬁrms over the whole sample period. However, there is
evidence of signiﬁcant gain in power by main banks against chaebol ﬁrms in Korea during
corporate restructuring during the post-crisis period in terms of the rate charged on loans. The
loan rate charged to chaebol ﬁrms relative to that charged to non-chaebol ﬁrms rises sharply
after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Although evidence of dilution of the chaebol advantage in terms
of compensating balance requirements in the post-crisis period is not statistically signiﬁcant,
chaebol ﬁrms go from being charged signiﬁcantly lower loan rates than non-chaebol ﬁrms in the
4 For an overview of the Japanese main bank system, see Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994).
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post-crisis period banks are able to charge client chaebol ﬁrms higher loan rates than they
charge non-chaebol ﬁrms. Our post-crisis results are consistent with the ﬁndings by Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) documenting the power of Japanese
main banks associated with rent-seeking behavior.
Our ﬁndings are also broadly consistent with the view by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein
(1991) who argue that ﬁnancial ties between main banks and their client ﬁrms reduce
information asymmetry and incentive problems, allow ﬁnancial ﬂexibility for ﬁrms, so that
ﬁrms may continue to proceed with ongoing projects. Since chaebol ﬁrms have close bank-ﬁrm
relationship, they have less incentive to hoard cash for precautionary needs. Thus, there exist
active internal capital markets among chaebol a$liated ﬁrms, and it appears that the markets
are not e$cient. This view is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis by Bae, Kang, and Kim
(2002), which argue that there exists wealth shifting within chaebol- a$liated ﬁrms. Our result
is also in line with the ﬁndings by Peterson and Rajan (1994) that small ﬁrms with close
bank-ﬁrm relationship have easier access to credit than those without such relationship
although the costs of funds are not signiﬁcantly lower. They do however ﬁnd that ﬁrms
borrowing from banks other than main banks are charged with higher rates.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe characteristics of Korean
ﬁrms with an emphasis on chaebol ﬁrms. Section 3 presents the existing literature on the
determinants of cash holdings and testable hypotheses in our study. The data and methodology
used in our paper are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents empirical results, which
documents the di#erence in bank power between chaebol ﬁrms and non-chaebol ﬁrms with
analysis for the full sample and pre- and post-crisis sub-sample periods. Then the section
investigates why chaebol ﬁrms have lower level of cash holdings than non-chaebol ﬁrms.
Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
II. Characteristics of Korean Firms
A chaebol, or a business group in Korea, is a giant conglomerate or ﬁnancial clique, and
is unique to the Korean corporate sector and has recently attracted much attention in
academia because of their role before and after the ﬁnancial crisis in Korea.
5 The chaebol
dominate the Korean economy. Krugman (1998) notes that the top 30 largest chaebol
companies account for nearly 40% of total economic activity in Korea in 1996. The largest
business groups such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK have over 50 a$liated companies.
The associated companies may include ﬁnancial service ﬁrms o#ering a full range of ﬁnancial
services from credit card and insurance to securities underwriting and venture capital. The top
ﬁve chaebol, in particular, have a median number of 6 ﬁnancial arms, while the median for top
30 chaebol is 2.
6
Yoo and Lee (1987) classify chaebol into three categories depending on the timing of their
formation. Chaebol formed in the late 1950s, such as Hyundai, Samsung, and Lucky-Goldstar
5 The chaebol system is similar to the Japanese keiretsu with regard to government sponsorship of a long-term
main bank-ﬁrm relationship, but di#ers fundamentally in that Korean banks did not own corporate equity.
6 A list of the top 30 chaebols in 1996 is provided in Appendix 1. The number of ﬁnancial arms for each chaebol
appears in the last column in Appendix 1.
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government vested properties. Chaebol of the 1960s, such as Hanjin, Korea Explosive, Hyosung,
Sangyoung, and Dong-A, were established as a result of foreign loans. Finally, Chaebols of the
1970s, such as Daewoo, Sunkyong (SK), Lotte, Kolon, and Doosan, were formed during a
period of economic boom and of unprecedented export growth. Throughout the post-Korean
War period the Government has sponsored the formation and growth of chaebol to forward
rapid economic growth and development.
The business activities of Korean chaebol ﬁrms are widely diversiﬁed. Yoo and Lee (1987)
ﬁnd that, among their sample ﬁrms in Korea, 72% of them have run more than two business
departments under one umbrella. In Samsung group, for example, major manufacturing ﬁrms
such as Samsung Electronics, Samsung Heavy Industries, and Samsung Chemical are connected
with a$liated ﬁrms by providing raw materials and intermediate goods and services like
Samsung Electro Devices, Samsung Corning, and Samsung Electro-Mechanics. This intra-group
trade, accompanied by ﬂexible credit terms, creates an internal capital market through
accounts receivable and accounts payable. Deloof (2001) points out that the existence of
intra-group claims lessens the need for liquid reserves. The third column in Appendix 1 reports
intra-group sales in ratio to total sales for each chaebol. The average (median) for the
intra-group sales to total sales ratio is 17.9 (14.9) percent for the top 30 chaebols and 24.5
(19.2) percent for the top 5 chaebols.
Despite the size and diversiﬁcation of the chaebol, most chaebol a$liated ﬁrms are still
under the control of the founding family owner. Chaebol ﬁrms are linked by direct or indirect
cross-shareholdings, and a founder-chairman typically serves in the core company. The
controlling shareholder in a chaebol is usually the CEO and Chairman of the Board; the other
members of the board are executives he has selected. There is evidence that the controlling
shareholders (owners) of chaebol have sought to maximize their inﬂuence by enlarging the size
of ﬁrms and of the group, even at the expense of proﬁtability.
7 The beneﬁts to controlling
shareholders include social, political, and economic rewards that are proportional to the scale
of operations ﬁrms. For example, if a chaebol acquires a new business division, the controlling
shareholder of the chaebol can sta# executive positions at the new business division with hand
picked subordinates.
Kook, Park, and Lee (1997) report evidence that the ﬁfty largest chaebols focused on the
ﬁrm growth rather than ﬁrm value. Choi, Park, and Kho (2000) ﬁnd that individual
non-chaebol ﬁrms also prefer growth in size to proﬁtability. Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat
(2003) also demonstrate the so-called “proﬁt stabilization hypothesis” where contending
Korean ﬁrms pursue enlargement rather than maximization of proﬁts. Government economic
development plans giving priority in ﬁnancing to large ﬁrms in the export sector, through the
provision of low loan rates and forbearance in rolling over bank loans, have given both chaebol
and non-chaebol ﬁrms an added incentive to emphasize growth of sales over proﬁt maximiza-
tion.
8
The ﬁnancial system has traditionally been used as an instrument for the Korean
7 Choi, Park, and Kho (2000) point out that this structure creates a conﬂict between the interests of the
controlling shareholder and the other shareholders of chaebol a$liated ﬁrms, since projects that advance the
interests of the group might be pursued at the expense of particular ﬁrm shareholders.
8 Most commercial banks were under government control in Korea. An example of one of the few commercial
banks free from government control is Shinhan Bank, established by Korean Japanese investors in 1982.
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banking system to channel credit to desired industries. Moreno (1998) notes that banks were
not free to use standard business criteria in evaluating and monitoring projects. Most
commercial banks were nationalized in the early 1960s, and the government inﬂuenced the
allocation of credit both directly through the appointment of bank management and credit
controls, and indirectly through various regulations and incentives. Although a privatization
program started in the earlier 1980s resulted in widely dispersed ownership of many commer-
cial banks, government continued to exercise de facto control of most banks through the late
1990s and competition in the banking system continued to be limited.
9 The result was a tightly
controlled government-administered ﬁnancial system characterized by a chronic excess de-
mand for credit, even by proﬁtable and viable ﬁrms. Borensztein and Lee (2000) provide
evidence of ine$cient credit allocations among Korean manufacturing sectors for the period
from 1970 to 1996 by comparing performance of ﬁrms and their ability to obtain credit.
Furthermore, there is the pervasive expectation that troubled borrowers and lenders would
beneﬁt from government bailouts, thus aggravating inherent adverse selection and moral
hazard in the market for credit.
In summary, Korean chaebol ﬁrms have been nurtured by the government, highly
diversiﬁed, controlled by a founding family, and drew more credit from banks than their
relatively poor proﬁt opportunities would in many cases justify.
III. Determinants of Cash Holdings
We use the determinants of cash holdings found in the previous studies as controls to
investigate the relation between cash holdings, interest expenses, and chaebol association.
Determinants of cash holdings can be grouped into three categories: Transactional motives;
Precautionary motives; Financing motives.
1. Transactional Motives
Cash is primarily needed to satisfy transactional motivation. Since cash inﬂows and
outﬂows are not perfectly synchronized, some level of cash holding is needed to serve as a
bu#er. As the conversion of long-term investments to readily available cash is costly, a trade
o# has to be made between the cost and beneﬁt of holding cash. This trade o# leads to an
optimal cash holdings of a ﬁrm, which several models including Baumol (1952) and Miller and
Orr (1966) describe. In this paper, we use the size of the ﬁrm and net working capital as a
proxy for the transactional motives.
Firm size: Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966) argue that ﬁrms with higher
demand for transaction will hold relatively lower cash holdings. Barclay and Smith (1995) also
state that larger ﬁrms have smaller cost of external ﬁnancing because of the scale economy
resulting from a substantial ﬁxed cost component of security issuance costs. Since larger ﬁrms
9 A number of researchers, including Berg (1999), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998),
argue that the combination of strong government and weak ﬁnancial institutions exacerbated adverse selection and
moral hazard in credit allocation in the period leading up to the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,*tend to have more transactions and greater economies of scale in cash management, we would
expect a negative relationship between ﬁrm size and investment in liquid assets.
Net working capital: Net working capital could work as a good substitute of liquidity.
Firms may choose to ensure themselves against losses by holding liquid assets besides cash. For
example, it is common for ﬁrms to sell o# non-core assets in periods of economic distress. It
is also becoming increasingly frequent for ﬁrms to liquidate receivables through factoring or
securitization as a means of raising liquidity.
2. Precautionary Motives
In an uncertain world with volatile cash ﬂows, a ﬁrm would keep more liquid reserves as
a precautionary motive against an unexpected shortfall in cash ﬂows. The higher the uncer-
tainty associated with expected cash ﬂows, the more precautionary liquid reserves the ﬁrm will
keep. Similarly, informational asymmetry would explain the precautionary needs for cash
holdings. Diamond (1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note the informational asymmetry
costs associated with bank lending. They argue that a higher level of informational asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and the lender will lead the bank more di$cult discern the credit quality of
their client ﬁrms. Because of a possible credit rationing by banks, ﬁrms may decide to hold cash
for precautionary reasons. We use the volatility of cash ﬂows and R&D cost as proxy for the
precautionary motive.
The volatility of cash ﬂow (Industry Sigma): As we discussed above, the ﬁrms with
relatively high volatility in cash ﬂow hold more cash as a precaution. Considering that Korean
capital market is not well developed, we expect that the e#ect of the volatility of cash ﬂows on
cash holdings would be signiﬁcant for Korean ﬁrms. We use industry cash ﬂows volatility
(industry sigma) as a measure of risk that a ﬁrm in an industry faces short falls in cash ﬂows.
R&D/sales: Research and development (R&D) to sales ratio is used as a proxy for
information asymmetry. Capital expenditures and research and development expenditures
have di#erent meanings especially in terms of asymmetric information. Firms with high capital
expenditures are considered to be involved in clearly deﬁned projects that outside investors can
easily verify, reducing information asymmetries as in Myers and Majluf (1984). In contrast,
R&D-intensive projects almost by deﬁnition generate information asymmetries, as it is di$cult
to verify progress, and the act of revealing information to the market may beneﬁt the ﬁrm’s
competitors and reduce the value of the project.
10 As discussed by Titman and Wessels
(1988), R&D expenditures can measure the degree of product specialization, which may
increase information asymmetry between the lender and the ﬁrm. Opler and Titman (1994)
further provide evidence that ﬁrms with high R&D/sales are more vulnerable to ﬁnancial
distress. Thus, ﬁrms with higher R&D would have higher cash holdings to avoid ﬁnancial
distress caused by information asymmetry.
10 See Zeckhuaser and Pound (1990) for the list of industries, which have high degrees of asymmetry informa-
tion based on R&D intensity (i.e., R&D to sales ratio). For example, pharmaceutical industry has very high R&D
intensity which the signiﬁcant informational opaqueness in this industry.
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Baskin (1987) argues that in a competitive market condition where the speed of
investment greatly matters, funds invested in liquid assets, so-called internal capital hold the
key advantage of instant availability. Financing motive can be also explained by employing the
pecking order theory. Asymmetric information may lead to ﬁnancing constraints and to
pecking order behavior as described by Myers and Majluf (1984). Firms have a certain pattern
of long term ﬁnancing as sources of funds. The pecking order theory contends that ﬁrms prefer
internal capital to external ﬁnancing, and if a funding requirement exceeds retained earnings,
debt issues are preferred to equity issues. The pecking order theory implies that if internally
generated cash is insu$cient to ﬁnance investment outlays, the ﬁrm will ﬁrst draw funds from
its liquidity reserves before raising funds externally.
11 We use the following variables as
proxies for ﬁnancing motives.
Leverage: Korean ﬁrms have been highly levered during our sample period along with the
high costs of borrowing. The opportunity costs of holding cash are even higher for ﬁrms with
high leverage since they may have to pay higher interest rate on their borrowings than ﬁrms
with low leverage. Thus, ﬁrms would hold less cash when their leverage is high.
Market to book value: High growth ﬁrms are expected to have more positive NPV
projects and have more to lose in case of a cash shortage. These ﬁrms will be inclined to hold
more capital in the ﬁrm in order to be able to ﬁnance future investment opportunities. Market
to book ratio is a proxy for Tobin’s Q representing the growth opportunity of ﬁrms. An
increase in the number of proﬁtable investment opportunities means that the ﬁrms have to give
up better projects when there is a cash shortage. Thus, ﬁrms with higher market to book value
would have larger cash holdings.
Cash ﬂow: Cash ﬂows have an ambiguous e#ect on cash holdings. Large cash ﬂow may
imply that ﬁrms do not have to hold large cash within the ﬁrm since ﬁrms can use cash ﬂows
to ﬁnance projects. However, it may also imply that ﬁrms maintain large cash holdings if ﬁrms
do not use large proportion of internally generated funds in the same period. Therefore, high
cash ﬂows may or may not lead to higher liquid reserves.
IV. Sample and Regression Model
1. Sample Collection
We use a unique data set provided by Seoul-based Korea Information Service (KIS) for
all industrial ﬁrms listed in Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and KOSDAQ stock market from
1991 to 2000.
12 KIS is the leading provider of credit related information and services for
ﬁnancial and commercial business transactions among corporations and consumer individuals
in Korea. Most previous studies on Korean ﬁrms employ PACAP database, but PACAP
11 Some researchers have identiﬁed ﬁrms with limited access to public ﬁnancial markets as those most likely to
face cash ﬂow constraints. (Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)).
12 KOSDAQ stock market is the Korean version of the NASDAQ market where a large number of fast-growing
young technology ﬁrms are listed. Interestingly, the bubble burst in KOSDAQ market around the same time it did
in early 2000.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,,Korea database provides only limited information on accounting and stock prices. For
example, research and development (R&D) expenditures and account receivables from
a$liated ﬁrms are not available from PACAP database for Korea. Unlike the PACAP
database, our data from KIS contains comprehensive ﬁnancial information for each KSE and
KOSDAQ ﬁrm. The company proﬁle and ﬁnancial information data are compiled from
ﬁnancial statements, business reports, and audit reports that every company is mandated to
produce on an annual basis. Financial service ﬁrms are excluded in our sample since the
motivations of holding cash for ﬁnancial institutions are di#erent from those for non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. Banks, for instance, may carry cash to meet capital requirements such as BIS ratio. Also
the accounting practices of banks are di#erent from those of ﬁrms in other industries.
We use the year-end Korean Consumer Price Index to deﬂate total assets in 2000 Korean
won. We select total of 6878 ﬁrm-year observations between 1991 and 2000. Among those 6878
observations, 843 ﬁrm-years are classiﬁed as chaebol ﬁrm observations and the remainder of
6035 ﬁrm-years as non-chaebol observations. We use the Korea Fair Trade Commission
(KFTC)’s annual report and Financial Supervisory Commission’s 1996 guideline to identify
whether ﬁrms are a$liated with chaebol or not.
13
2. Regression Models
Cash Holdings and Net Assets
We employ regression analysis similar to those used by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001). The dependent variable is loga-
rithm of cash ratio as in Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001). We use a
dummy variable for the chaebol ﬁrms. This dummy variable will reﬂect the impact of main
bank association on the cash holdings. In addition, we employ all potential determinants of
cash holdings as controls. Thus, our basic regression equation is the following:
LNCASHASSETitb0b1CHAEBOLitb2LNSIZEitb3MBitb4CFitb5NWCit
b6LEVitb7CAPEXPitb8R&Ditb9DIVitYeartIndtet (1)
where LNCASHASSET is log of cash divided by net assets (assets-cash). CHAEBOL takes a
value of one if a ﬁrm is in chaebol and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is logarithm of total assets. MB
is the sum of book value of assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity
divided by book value of total assets. CF is the sum of operating income and depreciation
divided by net assets. NWC is deﬁned as current assets minus current liability minus cash
divided by net assets. We remove cash from net working capital in order to avoid the impact
of cash included in working capital. LEV is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt
divided by total assets. CAPEXP is the sum of changes in ﬁxed asset and depreciation divided
by net assets. R&D is research and development cost divided by net assets. When R&D is listed
as missing, it is set to zero in order to maintain the ﬁrm-year in the sample. DIV takes a value
of one if dividends are paid out and zero otherwise. We include year dummy variables (Year)
13 KFTC legitimately deﬁnes a business group as “a group of companies, more than 30 percent of whose shares
are owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those individuals.” KFTC identiﬁes business groups
and announces them every year.
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include dummy variables for each industry (Ind) to control for industry e#ects. We use 2-digit
standard industry code to deﬁne industry.
Compensating Balance and Bank Loans
Despite the lower cash holdings level for chaebol ﬁrms, one may still argue that main
banks may extract rents from chaebol ﬁrms using other means. In order to investigate how the
main bank might extract rents from their client ﬁrms, we also examine the relation between the
ratio of compensating balance to bank loans and chaebol a$liation. Compensating balance is
technically deﬁned as the sum of other (interest-bearing) deposits (such as savings deposits)
and short-term ﬁnancial instruments (such as time deposits or certiﬁcate of deposits). When
the government regulates the spread between o$cial deposit and lending rates, banks may use
compensating balance to extract rents from their client ﬁrms. For example, banks may ask their
client ﬁrms to purchase time deposits or other bank products when they make loans to those
ﬁrms. The amount banks ask to be placed on deposits can come close to one-quarter of the loan
amount for some ﬁrms. Banks then turn, and make new proﬁtable loans to other clients with
those deposits. We predict that if main banks have power over their client ﬁrms, these ﬁrms
would have a higher compensating balance to bank loans ratio than ﬁrms without main banks.
Although there has been a set margin for banks’ pricing due to regulation, banks have
been e#ectively extracting rents to assume higher risks for ﬁrms with lower credit worthiness.
In other words, regardless of the credit worthiness, Korean banks have generally been o#ering
similar rates to their borrowers, but historically asked small borrowers to set aside substantial
portion of their loans as deposits, which then can be assumed by banks as collateral. For
example, when a small ﬁrm borrows $ 2 million at 10%, it might be forced to purchase $ 1
million of CDs at 5%. This indicates that the ﬁrm will need to generate returns for more than
15% out of the $ 1 million loan that the ﬁrm is actually using. If main banks use the
compensating balance as a way of raising the e#ective interest rate, the level of interest bearing
deposits would be higher relative to ﬁrms’ bank loans even though it is not higher relative to
net assets. This measure as a proxy for bank power is more appropriate for ﬁrms with small
bank loans relative to their assets. Furthermore, the ratio would be lower for chaebol ﬁrms
than non-chaebol ﬁrms if main banks can not impose more compensating balance to their
chaebol client ﬁrms.
We use the same format with regression (1) but we replace LNCASHASSET with
LNCBLOAN which is log of cash divided by bank loans in regression (2).
LNCBLOANitb0b1CHAEBOLitb2LNSIZEitb3MBitb4CFitb5NWCit
b6LEVitb7CAPEXPitb8ISitb9R&Ditb10DIVitYeartIndtet (2)
where LNCBLOAN is log of the ratio of the compensating balance to average bank loan.
Average bank loan is deﬁned as the sum of bank loans at the beginning and at the end of the
ﬁscal year divided by 2.
In order to tell whether the cash holdings in the pre-crisis period partly represent
compensating balances, we divide the sample period and run the regressions (2) separately for
each sub-period. The pre-crisis subperiod is between 1991 and 1996, and the post-crisis
subperiod is between 1997 and 2000. Since the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, charging higher interest
rate has been easier for Korean commercial banks because main banks have gained monopoly
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reduction in the compensating balance ratio from pre- to post-crisis period would be larger for
non-chaebol ﬁrms than for chaebol ﬁrms if banks extracted much rents from non-chaebol ﬁrms
than chaebol ﬁrms during the early 1990s.
Non-Bond Interest Expenses and Bank Loans
One important empirical implication that Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) provide is that the
availability of funds and costs of funds are two separate issues, and ﬁrms may not have both
in their favor. In other words, ﬁrms with close ties to main banks in Japan may have easy
access to credit, but they are charged higher because banks have power against them.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) show that main bank client ﬁrms pay 4.66%, while una$liated
ﬁrms pay only 3.96% where the interest rate is deﬁned as non-bond interest expenses divided
by non-bond liabilities.
Even though it is unlikely, it is possible that main banks in Korea charge higher interest
rate to their client chaebol ﬁrms than non-chaebol ﬁrms instead of imposing compensating




where LNINTLOAN is the log of the ratio of non-bond interest expenses to bank loan,
CHAEBOL takes a value of one if a ﬁrm is in chaebol and zero otherwise. LEV is the sum of
long-term debt and short-term debt divided by total assets, OI is operating income over sales,
and LNSALE is log of sales. Higher operating income and sales would have negative e#ect on
the non-bond interest expenses since proﬁtable and large ﬁrms tend to pay lower interest rate.
However, higher leverage would cause the bankruptcy risk higher and would have positive
e#ect on the non-bond interest expenses. We include year dummy variables (Year) to account
for macroeconomic e#ects as in Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001). In addition, we include
dummy variables for each industry (Ind) to control for industry e#ects. We use 2-digit
standard industry code to deﬁne industry. This will allow us to control for changes in
performance attributable to industry and year-wide factors.
V. Empirical Results
1. Univariate Analysis of Korean Firms
The summary statistics of cash to net-assets ratios are reported in Table 1. In contrast to
the predictions of the main bank monopoly hypothesis, we ﬁnd that chaebol ﬁrms have
signiﬁcantly lower cash holdings than non-chaebol ﬁrms. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the
mean and median cash holdings for the whole sample period are 9.5 percent and 5.8 percent
of net assets respectively while Panel Bs hows that the mean and median cash holdings for
non-chaebol ﬁrms are 10.1 percent and 6.3 percent of net assets respectively. That is, we ﬁnd
lower mean and median cash holdings for chaebol ﬁrms in Panel C of Table 1. Table 1 shows
that chaebol ﬁrms hold an average 2 to 6 percent lower cash holdings than non-chaebol ﬁrms
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showing that keiretsu ﬁrms are less liquidity constrained than non-group ﬁrms because of the
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility granted by main banks.
In order to investigate whether we ﬁnd lower cash holdings for chaebol ﬁrms because our
sample period includes the year of Asian Financial Crisis, we also examine the cash ratios of
chaebol and non-chaebol ﬁrms each year. Pre- and post-crisis analyses of cash ratios present
results consistent with the analysis of the whole sample period: Cash holding of chaebol ﬁrms
is lower than that of non-chaebol ﬁrms. However, both chaebol and non-chaebol ﬁrms hold very
low levels of cash after the crisis of 1997. This implies that the instability of ﬁnancial market,
reﬂected in extremely high and volatile interest rates, have increased the opportunity costs of
holding cash rather than that banks have less power in the post-crisis period. Our univariate
analysis of cash holdings for chaebol ﬁrms suggests that cash ratios reﬂect various aspects of
ﬁrm business environment including earnings prospects and macroeconomic circumstances.
Therefore, it is too equivocal to say with our sample that the higher level of cash holdings is
associated with bank power without any benchmarks. In Section 5.2, we will employ several
measures for bank power and test main bank relationship and bank power.
We present important ﬁnancial di#erences between chaebol and non-chaebol ﬁrms in
Table 2. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that chaebol ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly larger than non-chaebol ﬁrms in size.
The average (median) size of total assets of chaebol ﬁrms is almost 4 (9) times larger than that
of non-chaebol ﬁrms. This is hardly surprising, however, given the managerial objectives of
growth and diversifying e#orts widespread among chaebol ﬁrms in the Korean economy. The
market-to-book ratios are higher for non-chaebol ﬁrms than chaebol ﬁrms, suggesting that the
growth opportunity is higher for non-chaebol ﬁrms than chaebol ﬁrms in Table 2. We also ﬁnd
that chaebol-a$liated ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower cash ﬂows returns than non-chaebol ﬁrms.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that Japanese main bank client ﬁrms show poor perform-
ance due partly to main banks’ risk aversion and partly to main banks’ rent extractions. We
further o#er an over-investment problem as possible a reason for poor performance by
chaebol-a$liated ﬁrms in our sample since
Table 2 also shows that chaebol ﬁrms spend more on capital expenditures than do
non-chaebol ﬁrms. This may suggest that chaebol ﬁrms invest in less lucrative projects,
supporting the view of over-investment hypothesis in Korea by Shin and Park (1999).
Consistent with the result for cash ratio, chaebol ﬁrms hold less working capital as a
substitution of cash. We have negative working capital because it is deﬁned as current assets
minus current liabilities minus cash. The leverage is signiﬁcantly higher for chaebol ﬁrm than
for non-chaebol ﬁrms. However, the ratio of bank loans to total debt is lower for chaebol ﬁrms
than for non-chaebol ﬁrms. However, R&D investment is slightly lower for chaebol ﬁrms than
for non-chaebol ﬁrms.
The last three rows of Table 2 present the summary statistics of cash holdings normalized
by net assets, compensating balance normalized by the average bank loan, and non-bond
interest expenses normalized by average bank loan. As it is shown in Table 1, non-chaebol ﬁrms
hold larger cash holdings than chaebol ﬁrms, and it is true even when we use average bank
loans to normalize compensating balance. We can also ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant di#erence
in the ratio of compensating balance to average bank loan between chaebol ﬁrms and
non-chaebol ﬁrms. The median compensating balance ratio for chaebol ﬁrms is 10.6%, while
that for non-chaebol ﬁrms is 24.8%. This indicates that for non-chaebol ﬁrms, they might be
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Table 2 shows that the median non-bond interest expenses to bank loan ratios for chaebol ﬁrms
and non-chaebol ﬁrms are close to each other. This is consistent with the notion that the
nominal borrowing rates for ﬁrms in Korea are similar regardless of the credit worthiness due
to regulatory arrangement.
In summary, the results of the summary statistics describe chaebol ﬁrms are on average
signiﬁcantly larger than non-chaebol ﬁrms, but are more levered, less liquid, and valued less
than non-chaebol ﬁrms by the market. Chaebol ﬁrms seem to have less growth opportunities
than non-chaebol ﬁrms in spite of a higher level of capital expenditure, while these are
consistent with the low level of the R&D intensity.
2. Regression Analysis of Cash Holdings
Cash Holdings and Net Assets
Table 3 shows that the coe$cient of each variable is consistent with the theoretical
predictions we have discussed earlier. We employ OLS pooled regressions with both year and
industry dummies (Regression I). This will allow us to control for changes in performance
attributable to industry and year-wide factors. For robustness check, we further employ Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression (Regression II) because OLS pooled regression may violate
the independently and identically distributed error assumption. Fama-MacBeth regression
eliminates the problem of serial correlation in the residuals of a time-series cross-sectional
regression. Each year, we run cross-sectional regressions, and then use the time series of the
regression coe$cients to make any inference by taking the average. The coe$cient of chaebol
dummy is signiﬁcant and negative across di#erent regression methods. That is, we conﬁrm the
result of univariate analysis that ﬁrms that are members of the top 30 largest chaebol hold less
cash than non-chaebol ﬁrms even after controlling for other determinants of cash holdings.
The coe$cient of ﬁrm size is consistently negative across the regression methods applied
here, which implies that there are economies of scale in cash management of Korean ﬁrms in
accordance with theory of Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966). In other words, for a
transactional motivation, larger Korean ﬁrms would have less cash holdings to assets,
consistent with results of the U.S and Japanese ﬁrms, but contrary to that of the German ﬁrms.
Korean ﬁrms’ cash holdings are also a#ected by the ﬁnancing motivation. Consistent with
the pecking order theory, Korean ﬁrms have higher level of leverage when internal cash
holding level is low. A negative relation between leverage and cash holdings also supports the
view that ﬁrms would rather reduce debt than hold more cash holdings when leverage is high
as in Myers and Majluf (1984). Also, consistent with the ﬁnancing motivation, a ﬁrm with a
high market to book ratio shows higher cash holdings levels. This indicates that ﬁrms with high
growth potential hold more cash in order to ensure that they will be able to realize expected
future proﬁt, even in the status where external capital becomes di$cult to obtain.
It is evident that cash ﬂow has a signiﬁcant positive association with cash holdings. This
may support the argument that credit market frictions are prevalent and are hence responsible
for the high correlation between cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm and its own cash holdings. The
coe$cient of net working capital could a#ect either positively or negatively on cash holdings.
In the case of Korean ﬁrms, coe$cient of net working capital is signiﬁcantly negative in
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and marketable securities overwhelms the e#ect of conversion cycle. This is consistent with
results for the U.S and Japan. For German ﬁrms, net working capital is insigniﬁcant. It seems
that Korean ﬁrms’ cash holdings are positively related to the transactional motivation, when
motivation is proxied by the ﬁrm size and net working capital.
Firms in Korea have a negative relationship between capital expenditures and cash
holdings. This suggests that ﬁrms with better investment opportunities invest more, and they
hold less cash internally. The coe$cient of R&D intensity is signiﬁcant in OLS pooled
regression I, but is insigniﬁcant in Fama-MacBeth regression II. It appears that this is driven
by only a few observations with a substantial of R&D expenditures compared to the U.S and
Japan. More than half of our sample ﬁrms report very little R&D expenditures. Positive and
signiﬁcant coe$cient of dividend dummy indicates that ﬁrms paying dividends have larger
cash holdings.
In summary, we ﬁnd from the cash regressions results that chaebol ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly
less cash than non-chaebol ﬁrms even after controlling for the e#ects of numerous determinants
of cash holdings. With regard to the other determinants, we ﬁnd that cash holdings of Korean
ﬁrms increase with the market to book ratio, cash ﬂow, and dividend. However, cash holdings
of Korean ﬁrms decrease with ﬁrm size, net working capital, leverage, and capital expendi-
tures.
Compensating Balance and Bank Loan
Table 4 presents estimation of compensating balance to bank loan ratio regressions. We
again employ OLS pooled regressions with both year and industry dummies (Regression I),
and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression (Regression II). Although we normalize the
compensating balance by average bank loan, the coe$cient of chaebol dummy is negative and
signiﬁcant in all three regressions in Panel A of Table 4. The coe$cients of ﬁrm size and
leverage variables are negative and signiﬁcant in all three regressions as they are in Table 3.
This indicates that larger ﬁrms hold less cash for each dollar of bank loan possibly due to their
bargaining power against banks, and highly levered ﬁrms hold less cash possibly due to higher
opportunity cost of holding cash.
In order to test the hypothesis that Korean banks gained power over their client ﬁrms
during the corporate restructuring after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in late 1997, an interaction
term (CHAEBOL x Post), which takes a value 1 for chaebol ﬁrms during 1997 to 2000 and
zero during 1991-1996, is added to the regression models in Panel Bo f Table 4. If banks gained
power against chaebol ﬁrms during the restructuring process of the corporate sector after the
crisis, the “magnitude” of the negative relationship between compensating balance to bank
loan ratio and chaebol a$liation should be smaller in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis
period. Consistent with a gain in power by banks relative to the chaebol ﬁrms in the post-crisis
period, the coe$cient of the interaction term is positive. However, the coe$cient of the
interaction term is statistically insigniﬁcant suggesting that the e#ect of the chaebol dummy on
the compensating balance to bank loan ratio is not signiﬁcantly di#erent in the post-crisis
period from that in the pre-crisis period.
Non-Bond Interest Expenses and Bank Loan
In this section, we explore whether the cost of borrowing for chaebol ﬁrms is higher than
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,2that for non-chaebol ﬁrms. Instead of requesting that their client ﬁrms hold larger cash
balances or compensating balances at the bank, main banks in Korea may charge higher
interest rate for chaebol ﬁrms than for non-chaebol ﬁrms if they have monopoly power.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) report evidence that main banks in Japan charge higher interest
rates to ﬁrms with close ties because using the informational advantage main banks may
exercise power.
We ﬁrst explore whether banks charge higher interest rates to chaebol ﬁrms with main
banks following the argument by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). Panel A of Table 5 shows that
the coe$cients for chaebol dummy are not signiﬁcant in the three regression models (with year
dummies, with year and industry dummies, and in the Fama-MacBeth regression). The results
in Panel A suggest that main banks do not charge di#erent loan rates between chaebol and
non-chaebol ﬁrms. In Panel Bo f Table 6 we report results when an interaction term
(CHAEBOL x Post) to capture di#erential e#ects in loan rates between the pre-crisis and
post-crisis periods is added to equation (3). The di#erential loan rate charged by banks to
chaebol ﬁrms compared to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the pre-crisis period is given by the coe$cient
on the chaebol dummy. The di#erential loan rate charged by banks to chaebol ﬁrms compared
to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the post-crisis period is given by the sum of the coe$cients on the
chaebol dummy and on the interaction term (CHAEBOL x Post). We predict that the term to
be positive since we hypothesize that banks gain power after the onset of the crisis.
The results in Panel Bo f Table 5 show that the interaction term (CHAEBOL x Post) is
positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting a sharp change in the di#erential loan
rates charged by banks to chaebol ﬁrms compared to non-chaebol ﬁrms between the pre-crisis
and the post-crisis periods. The coe$cients for CHAEBOL are signiﬁcant and negative,
indicating that in the pre-crisis period, banks charged lower loan rates to chaebol ﬁrms than to
non-chaebol ﬁrms. In contrast, the di#erential loan rate charged by banks to chaebol ﬁrms
compared to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the post-crisis period, given by the sum of the coe$cients on
the chaebol dummy and on the interaction term (CHAEBOL x Post), is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in Regression I.
The results in Table 5 indicate that interest rates are signiﬁcantly lower for chaebol ﬁrms
than for non-chaebol ﬁrms during the pre-crisis period, while the pattern is signiﬁcantly
reversed during the corporate restructuring in the post-crisis period. This evidence for the
post-crisis period is supportive of the greater main bank power hypothesis and is consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings for main bank power against Japanese ﬁrms by Weinstein and
Yafeh (1998) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001).
3. Why Are Cash Holdings Lower for Chaebol Firms?
In the previous section, we show evidence consistent with the hypothesis that main banks
in Korea extract rents from their client chaebol ﬁrms during the post-crisis period using the
non-bond interest rates as a proxy for bank power. In this section, we investigate why chaebol
ﬁrms’ cash holdings are still lower than non-chaebol ﬁrms even after the ﬁnancial crisis
considering that the level of cash holdings is a proxy for bank rent extractions. First, we argue
that chaebol ﬁrms have better access to external capital so that Korean main bank does not
have monopoly power against chaebol ﬁrms. As shown in Appendix 1, most chaebol group
ﬁrms have ﬁnancial services arms such as securities, insurance, or ﬁnance companies. Thus, it
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than other chaebol ﬁrms (recall that our chaebol classiﬁcation is the top 30 group classiﬁed by
KFTC). In order to see whether ﬁnancial arms of chaebol ﬁrms can substitute somehow the
role of main banks, and explain cash holding patterns of Korean ﬁrms between chaebol and
non-chaebol, we divide ﬁrms a$liated with top 30 chaebols into two groups: group of chaebol
ﬁrms which have ﬁnancial services arms; the other group has no ﬁnancial arms.
In order to see whether those chaebol ﬁrms with ﬁnancial arms have signiﬁcantly lower




where all other variables are deﬁned in the model (1) in the previous section. If cash holdings
are partly determined by chaebol’s ownership of ﬁnancial arms, the coe$cient of ﬁnancial arms
dummy, FINARMS, would be negative and signiﬁcant, and it is consistent with the notion
that chaebol ﬁrms reduce their cash holdings using their ﬁnancial arms.
For regression model (4), we run all three types of regressions used in the previous section
and ﬁnd that the coe$cient of FINARMS is not signiﬁcant in any regression. Even though it
is highly likely that chaebol ﬁrms with ﬁnancial arms can access external funds more easily than
other chaebol ﬁrms, regression results do not show evidence supporting the notion that
ﬁnancial arms reduce cash holdings of chaebol ﬁrms.
Another possible explanation consistent with the results in the previous section is that
chaebol ﬁrms have better access to commercial paper markets and short-term corporate bond
markets. The proportion of direct ﬁnancing to total liability would be higher for chaebol ﬁrms
than for non-chaebol ﬁrms so that chaebol ﬁrms might have bargaining power against their
main bank. It is also argued that the corporate bond markets are better facilitated after the
ﬁnancial crisis. Since chaebol ﬁrms have easier access to bond markets than non-chaebol ﬁrms,
chaebol ﬁrms are expected to have lower bank loan to total liability ratio than non-chaebol
ﬁrms, and the di#erence would be even greater in the post-crisis period.
Consistent with this prediction, we ﬁnd (in results not reported) that the ratio of bank
loan to total liability is lower for chaebol ﬁrms than for non-chaebol ﬁrms, and the di#erence
is larger in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. This ﬁnding supports the notion
of Diamond (1991) that borrowers will start building their reputation by having monitored
borrowing, and later move onto issuing directly placed debt. The median ratio of bank loan to
total debt is 41.8 percent and 40.4 percent for chaebol ﬁrms and non-chaebol ﬁrms respectively
before 1997 while it is 34 percent and 42.5 percent for chaebol ﬁrms and non-chaebol ﬁrms
respectively after 1997. The di#erence is signiﬁcant at one percent level after 1997.
We use the following regression model to capture the e#ect of existence of corporate bond
in the liability structure on cash holdings where the corporate bond is used a proxy for ﬁrm’s




where BONDDUM takes value of one if a ﬁrm has positive amount of bond, and otherwise
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more likely to raise funds in the bond market than are other ﬁrms. In the full sample
BONDDUM has mean 0.837 for chaebol ﬁrms and mean 0.566 for other ﬁrms. Interestingly,
a smaller proportion of ﬁrms raise funds in the bond market after the 1997 crisis than before
the crisis, particularly in the case of non-chaebol ﬁrms. The mean of BONDDUM falls from
0.847 to 0.825 for chaebol ﬁrms and from 0.699 to 0.457 for non-chaebol ﬁrms over the pre-
and post-crisis sub-periods. This indicates that the access to capital market has become
substantially harder for non-chaebol ﬁrms after the crisis.
The results from estimating equation (5) are reported in Panel A of Table 6 for the full
sample. Panel Br eports results when an interaction term (CHAEBOL x Post) to capture
di#erences in the e#ect of chaebol dummy between pre-crisis and post-crisis samples. The
results from estimating equation (5) for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods separately are
reported in Panels C and D of Table 6, respectively. We ﬁnd that the coe$cient of
BONDDUM is signiﬁcantly negative in the full sample and both the pre- and post-crisis sub
periods even after controlling for chaebol dummies. This indicates that chaebol and non-
chaebol ﬁrms with access to the bond markets maintain lower cash holdings than do ﬁrms
without such access. In the pre-crisis period, the coe$cients of BONDDUM are negative and
statistically signiﬁcant across all regressions, but the magnitude of the coe$cients is smaller
than for post-crisis period. This may indicate that the privilege of easy access to the bond
market in the post-crisis period is especially valuable and help reduce hoarding cash for
precautionary needs.
The coe$cient on CHAEBOL remains statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions and across
all samples that include BONDDUM in Table 6. The statistical insigniﬁcance of the interac-
tion term (CHAEBOL x Post) in Panel Bi ndicates no signiﬁcant di#erence in the e#ect of the
chaebol dummy on cash holdings between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Thus, chaebol
ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower cash balances than non-chaebol ﬁrms even after controlling for
access to the bond market. Also, inclusion of BONDDUM does not reduce the magnitude of
the e#ect on cash holdings of chaebol status, as comparison of results in Table 3 with those in
Table 6 attest. Access to the bond market would seem to reduce cash holdings by about half
the reduction brought by chaebol status based on the OLS regressions for the full sample (and
about one-quarter less based on the Fama-MacBeth regression).
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the e#ect of main bank relationship on the cash and other deposits
holdings, and on the cost of borrowings using all listed chaebol and non-chaebol industrial
ﬁrms in Korea. We ﬁnd that the level of cash holdings is lower for chaebol ﬁrms than for
non-chaebol ﬁrms during the 1990s. In addition to cash holdings, we also examine the ratio of
compensating balance to bank loan and the ratio of non-bond interest expenses to bank loan.
We further report ﬁnd that the ratios are signiﬁcantly lower for chaebol ﬁrms than for
non-chaebol ﬁrms in the univariate analysis, while various regression analyses indicate that
there has been some shift in bank power against their clients ﬁrms over the last decade.
Unlike Japanese main banks, which have power over their related ﬁrms, Korean main
banks seem to be too weak to extract rents from their client ﬁrms especially during the
2004] 9D B6>C 76C@H :MIG68I G:CIH ;GDB I=:>G 8A>:CI ;>GBH? -+pre-crisis period. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the top 30 chaebols are able to avoid compensating
balance requirements imposed by banks on other less prestigious ﬁrms. A major reason for this
result has to lie with the e#ective government inﬂuence on banks in Korea and government
policy of favorable treatment for the largest chaebol as a means of achieving rapid economic
development. We investigate why main banks in Korea do not extract rents from their client
ﬁrms using their long-term relationship, and ﬁnd that the ability to access bond market
signiﬁcantly reduces cash holdings. However, it is found that although ﬁrms raising funds
through issuing bonds hold lower cash balances, chaebol ﬁrms continue to hold lower cash
balances than other ﬁrms with equal status on this dimension. Some chaebol ﬁrms can
potentially beneﬁt from ﬁnancial services arms. However, it is found that availability of a
ﬁnancial arm does not a#ect cash holding by chaebol ﬁrms. Thus, we provide an alternative
explanation for the low cash holdings phenomenon of Korean chaebol ﬁrms. It appears that
there exist active internal capital markets among chaebol a$liated ﬁrms, and this has made
ﬁrms to hoard less cash for precautionary needs a view consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Sharfstein (1991). However, the internal capital market within a chaebol group appears to be
ine$cient and there exists wealth shifting (i.e., tunneling) within chaebol a$liated ﬁrms as in
Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002).
Many claim that Korean banks have gained power over their client ﬁrms during the
restructuring process of the corporate sector after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis since late 1997.
There is evidence (not statistically signiﬁcant) of a reduction in the magnitude of the negative
relationship between compensating balance to loan ratio and ﬁrms with chaebol a$liation in
the post-crisis period, although it is unclear whether this reﬂects some increased bank power,
or simply deteriorated liquidity constraint given much higher interest rates during the 1997-
2000 period. We ﬁnd that the loan rate charged to chaebol ﬁrms relative to that charged to
non-chaebol ﬁrms rises sharply after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. During 1997-2000, bank power
arguments by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) may apply,
concerning the association of higher interest rates charged by main banks to client ﬁrms with
chaebol a$liation, suggesting main bank power hypothesis at work.
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Cash is the sum of cash on hand (#1100) and marketable securities (#1140) and denominator is net-assets
(Asset-Cash). The sample period is from 1991 to 2000. There are 6,878 ﬁrm-year observations: 6,035 non-chaebol
ﬁrm-years and 843 chaebol ﬁrm-years.
Panel A. Whole sample






1991 475 0.124 0.148 0.086 0.054
1992 476 0.121 0.144 0.087 0.052
1993 481 0.121 0.146 0.084 0.052
1994 502 0.135 0.166 0.088 0.048
1995 529 0.131 0.161 0.087 0.043
1996 723 0.126 0.165 0.085 0.044
1997 816 0.134 0.159 0.082 0.044
1998 826 0.152 0.172 0.077 0.035
1999 937 0.104 0.118 0.045 0.016
2000 1113 0.083 0.096 0.040 0.014
Total 6878 0.120 0.145 0.073 0.034
Panel B. Non-chaebol ﬁrms






1991 400 0.131 0.155 0.090 0.058
1992 401 0.128 0.153 0.092 0.056
1993 406 0.129 0.156 0.090 0.057
1994 424 0.145 0.176 0.099 0.055
1995 449 0.141 0.174 0.093 0.048
1996 635 0.135 0.178 0.096 0.052
1997 727 0.142 0.168 0.088 0.046
1998 736 0.162 0.186 0.083 0.036
1999 843 0.110 0.130 0.051 0.017
2000 1014 0.087 0.100 0.043 0.014
Total 6035 0.128 0.155 0.078 0.037
Panel C. Chaebol ﬁrms






1991 75 0.088 0.111 0.073 0.036
1992 75 0.085 0.105 0.071 0.045
1993 75 0.077 0.095 0.058 0.032
1994 78 0.079 0.087 0.048 0.028
1995 80 0.076 0.097 0.050 0.031
1996 88 0.057 0.064 0.034 0.023
1997 89 0.069 0.074 0.049 0.030
1998 90 0.075 0.092 0.047 0.028
1999 94 0.045 0.048 0.027 0.008
2000 99 0.038 0.044 0.020 0.007
Total 843 0.067 0.081 0.044 0.025
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June -0T67A: 2. D:H8G>EI>K: SI6I>HI>8H: C=6:7DA F>GBH KH.N DC-C=6:7DA F>GBH
Total assets are ﬁrst normalized into year 2000 Korean Won using the year-end Korean Consumer Price Index,
then translated into US dollars using Korean Won/ US Dollar exchange at the end of year 2000. Market to Book
is deﬁned as (book value of assets-book value of equity  market value of equity)/assets. Cash Flow is deﬁned as
(operating income plus depreciation) divided by net assets. Net working capital is deﬁned as (current assets minus
current liabilities minus cash) divided by net assets. Total leverage is deﬁned as long-term plus short-term debt/
total assets. Capital expenditures are deﬁned as (changes in ﬁxed asset plus depreciation) divided by net assets.
Industry is deﬁned as the same 2 digit of Standard Industry Code for Korea. R&D is R&D divided by net assets.
When R&D is listed as missing, it is set to zero. Cash is the sum of cash on hand (#1100) and marketable
securities (#1140). Net-assets are assets minus cash. Compensating balance is the sum of other deposits (#1134)
and short-term ﬁnancial instruments (#1220). If compensating balance is missing than compensating balance is
equal to the cash (#1100). If compensating balance/average bank loan is greater than 10, we treat them as
missing. Interest is interest expenses (#6110).
All Non-chaebol Chaebol Di#erence
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-stat Median p-value
Total assets (million dollar) 447.6 91.6 306.9 75.9 1455.3 706.5 1148.4 14.07 630.6 0.00
Market to book ratio 1.122 0.960 1.138 0.958 1.006 0.964 0.132 5.15 0.006 0.48
Cash ﬂow 0.062 0.065 0.062 0.066 0.057 0.059 0.006 2.17 0.007 0.00
Net working capital 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.082 0.078 0.089 10.71 0.092 0.00
Leverage 0.676 0.650 0.663 0.631 0.768 0.757 0.105 9.99 0.127 0.00
Bank loan / Debt 0.411 0.412 0.414 0.414 0.389 0.396 0.025 4.06 0.019 0.00
Capital expenditures 0.045 0.022 0.044 0.020 0.051 0.033 0.007 1.48 0.013 0.00
R&D / Net assets 0.0015 0.000 0.0016 0.000 0.0010 0.000 0.0006 5.17 0.000 0.00
Cash / Net assets 0.120 0.073 0.128 0.078 0.067 0.044 0.060 17.82 0.035 0.00
Compensating Balance /
Avg. bank loan
0.528 0.224 0.570 0.248 0.233 0.106 0.337 14.37 0.143 0.00
Interest / Avg. bank loan 0.378 0.146 0.273 0.145 1.123 0.157 0.851 1.01 0.012 0.00
9D B6>C 76C@H :MIG68I G:CIH ;GDB I=:>G 8A>:CI ;>GBH? 2004] -1T67A: 3. EHI>B6I>DC D; C6H= ID N:I AHH:IH R6I>D R:<G:HH>DCH
Dependent variable is a logarithm of cash divided by net assets. CHAEBOL is a dummy which takes the value of
one if a ﬁrm belongs to chaebol, and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is logarithm of total asset. MB is the sum of book
value of assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. CF is operating
income plus depreciation divided by net asset. NWC is current assets minus current liability minus cash divided by
net asset. LEV is long-term plus short-term debt divided by total assets. CAPEXP is changes in ﬁxed asset plus
depreciation divided by net asset. R&D is research and development cost divided by net assets. When R&D is
missing, it is set to zero. DIV is a dummy that takes one if dividends are paid out, and zero otherwise. INDUM is
a dummy for 2 digit of standard industry code of Korea. Regression I is a cross-sectional time-series regression
and includes year and industry dummies. Regression II is an average of time-series coe$cients of Fama-MacBeth
cross-sectional regressions. t-stats of Regression II are from time-series coe$cients of regressions. t-stats are in
parentheses.
LNCASHASSETit  b0  b1CHAEBOLit  b2LNSIZEit  b3MBit  b4CFit  b5NWCit  b6LEVit
 b7CAPEXPit  b8R&Dit  b9DIVit  Yeart  Indt  et (1)














=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June -2T67A: 4. EHI>B6I>DC D; CDBE:CH6I>C< B6A6C8: ID B6C@ LD6C R6I>D R:<G:HH>DCH
Dependent variable is a logarithm of compensating balance divided by average bank loan where average bank loan
is the average of beginning and ending bank loan. Compensating balance is the sum of other deposits (#1134) and
short-term ﬁnancial instruments (#1220). If compensating balance is missing than compensating balance is equal
to the cash (#1100). If compensating balance/average bank loan is greater than 10, we treat them as missing.
CHAEBOL is a dummy which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm belongs to chaebol, and zero otherwise. CHAEBOL
x Post is an interaction term which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm belongs to chaebol in the post-crisis period, and
zero otherwise. LNSIZE is logarithm of total asset. MB is the sum of book value of assets and market value of
equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. CF is operating income plus depreciation divided by net
asset. NWC is current assets minus current liability minus cash divided by net asset. LEV is long-term plus
short-term debt divided by total assets. CAPEXP is changes in ﬁxed asset plus depreciation divided by net asset. R
&D is research and development cost divided by net assets. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. DIV is a
dummy that takes one if dividends are paid out, and zero otherwise. INDUM is a dummy for 2 digit of standard
industry code of Korea. Regression I is a cross-sectional time-series regression and includes year and industry
dummies. Regression II is an average of time-series coe$cients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions.
t-stats of Regression II are from time-series coe$cients of regressions. t-stats are in parentheses.
LNCBLOANt  b0  b1CHAEBOLit  b2LNSIZEit  b3MBit  b4CFit  b5NWCit  b6LEVit
 b7CAPEXPit  b8R&Dit  b9DIVit  Yeart  Indt  et (2)
Panel A: Full sample (1991-2000)
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Panel B: Post-crisis period dummy for chaebol ﬁrms
Regression I
CHAEBOL 0.420(5.95)
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Dependent variable is a logarithm of non-bond interest expenses (#6110) divided by average bank loan where
average. CHAEBOL is a dummy which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm belongs to chaebol, and zero otherwise.
CHAEBOL x Post is an interaction term which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm belongs to chaebol in the
post-crisis period, and zero otherwise. LEV is long-term plus short-term debt divided by total assets. OI is
operating income divided by net asset. LNSALE is a logarithm of sales. INDUM is a dummy for 2 digit of
standard industry code of Korea. Regression I is a cross-sectional time-series regression and includes year and
industry dummies. Regression II is an average of time-series coe$cients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional
regressions. t-stats of Regression II are from time-series coe$cients of regressions. t-stats are in parentheses.
LNINTLOANit  b0  b1CHAEBOLit  b2LEVit  b3OIit  b4LNSALEit  Yeart  Indt  et (3)
Panel A: Full sample (1991-2000)









Panel B: Post-crisis period dummy for chaebol ﬁrms
Regression I
CHAEBOL 0.159(4.16)
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Dependent variable is a logarithm of cash divided by net assets. BONDDUM is a dummy that takes one if a ﬁrm has
positive amount of bond, and zero otherwise. CHAEBOL is a dummy which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm belongs
to chaebol, and zero otherwise. CHAEBOL x Post is an interaction term which takes the value of one if a ﬁrm
belongs to chaebol in the post-crisis period, and zero otherwise. LNSIZE is logarithm of total asset. MB is the sum of
book value of assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. CF is operating
income plus depreciation divided by net asset. NWC is current assets minus current liability minus cash divided by net
asset. LEV is long-term plus short-term debt divided by total assets. CAPEXP is changes in ﬁxed asset plus
depreciation divided by net asset. R&D is research and development cost divided by net assets. When R&D is missing,
it is set to zero. DIV is a dummy that takes one if dividends are paid out, and zero otherwise. INDUM is a dummy
for 2 digit of standard industry code of Korea. Regression I is a cross-sectional time-series regression and includes
year and industry dummies. Regression II is an average of time-series coe$cients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional
regressions. t-stats of Regression II are from time-series coe$cients of regressions. The pre-crisis subperiod is between
1991 and 1996, and the post-crisis subperiod is between 1997 and 2000. t-stats are in parentheses.
LNCASHASSETit  b0  b1BONDDUMit  b2CHAEBOLit  b3LNSIZEit  b4MBit  b5CFit  b6NWCit
 b7LEVit  b8CAPEXPit  b9R&Dit  b10DIVit  Yeart  Indt  et (5)
Panel A: Full sample (1991-2000)
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Panel C: Pre-crisis sub-period
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Panel D: Post-crisis sub-period















=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June ..14 The ﬁgures are based on Chang and Hong (1998).
AEE:C9>M 1. PG:-CG>H>H TDE 30 BJH>C:HH GGDJEH (chaebol) >C KDG:6
This table shows main bank information for top 30 chaebols before the crisis as of the ﬁscal year ending in 1996.
The table also shows the number of a$liated ﬁrms and the amounts of the internal trading that sell and buy goods
and services to and from other a$liated ﬁrms during the ﬁscal year 1996. Hanil Bank and Commercial Bank of
Korea merged in 2000 to form Hanvit Bank.








1 Hyundai Korea Exchange 57 17.8 6
2 Samsung Hanil 80 31.5 8
3 LuckyGoldstar(LG) Korea First 49 18.8 7
4 Daewoo Korea First 32 35.4 5
5 SK Korea First 46 19.2 2
6 Ssangyong Cho Hung 25 35.5 5
7 Kia Korea First 28 19.9 3
8 Hanjin Hanil 24 5.7 2
9 Korea Explosive Hanil 31 32.6 6
10 Lotte Commercial 30 7.1 1
11 Kumho Cho Hung 26 11.8 2
12 Halla Korea Exchange 18 29.8 0
13 Doosan Commercial 25 14.6 2
14 Dong-ah Commercial 19 0.6 1
15 Daelim Hanil 21 2.0 3
16 Hansol Hanil 23 17.8 1
17 Kolon Hanil 24 5.3 0
18 Jinro Commercial 24 15.4 2
19 Dongkuk Seoul 17 6.3 1
20 Kohap Hanil 13 43.3 0
21 Dongbu Seoul 34 9.0 8
22 Haitai Cho Hung 15 5.5 4
23 Newcore Korea First 18 0.0 5
24 Anam Cho Hung 21 72.6 1
25 Tongyang Hanil 24 9.8 0
26 Hannil Hanil 7 1.0 0
27 Keopyung Cho Hung 22 15.2 0
28 Miwon Hanil 25 18.7 5
29 Hyosung Hanil 18 10.2 0
30 Shinho Korea First 25 9.3 1
Average (Median) 27 (24) 17.4 (14.9) 2.7 (2)
Top 5 Average (Median) 53 (49) 24.5 (19.2) 5.6 (6)
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